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"GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MANY OF SMALL MEANS": 
NEW JERSEY'S AGRICULTURAL COLONIES*

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ABSTRACT. Pogroms in the Russian Pale in 1881 set off a wave of immigration of Russian Jews to the United States. Most went to the cities, but an important group, with the support of philanthropic organizations, became part of an experiment in Jewish agricultural colonies. South Jersey's Alliance and Woodbine were the most successful. Both were established on undeveloped land, and the landscape that emerged suggests the importance the funders placed on using landscape as a means of Americanization. Keywords: Jewish agricultural colonies, New Jersey, Russian Jewish migration.

The year 1881 was especially difficult for Russian Jews. Pogroms across the Jewish Pale in southwestern Russia set off a wave of emigration, and by 1915 more than 3 million Jews had left the region. The largest number went to the United States, where they accounted for the second largest group of new immigrants. New York City's Lower East Side, with its intense crush of people, noise, and smells, became their new cultural landscape. My grandfather was a fairly typical member of this wave. A tailor, he arrived in New York in 1905 from Kiev, hoping for a better life. My mother remembered all the children sleeping in a bed in the kitchen at night, wandering through the pushcarts during the day, playing in the streets, and, after they had moved uptown, returning to the old neighborhood to reconnect, to shop and chat, and to eat knishes and pastrami in the familiar delicatessens.

This was a very American story—one that many waves of immigrants to America can tell—but with a difference. The narrative I absorbed growing up featured a form of Jewish exceptionalism within American exceptionalism.¹ Waves of immigrants were drawn to America's abundant, free, and productive land. With that land they produced other waves—amber waves of grain. These two different waves went together—except for the Jews—because, unlike other ethnic groups who came to America, Eastern European Jews were urban when they arrived and stayed urban afterward.² In most of Russia they had been prohibited from owning land and farming, so they worked instead as middlemen or craftsmen.

What I was taught, although it reflected much Russian Jewish immigrant experience, was incomplete and overdrawn both for Jews and non-Jews. Many non-Jewish new immigrants filled America's cities. And although most Jewish immigrants headed to the cities, some became farmers. Alliance and Woodbine, two agricultural colonies formed in New Jersey at the end of the nineteenth century with sub-

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stantial funding from Jewish philanthropic interests, are particularly interesting because they were explicitly intended to provide a counterpoint to the Lower East Side, an alternative cultural landscape that would build a different cultural identity. The agricultural colonies were intended to bring people and land together in ways that would produce an environment that was pastoral, healthful, and productive and would thus shift perception and narrative.

An examination of these colonies enlarges understanding of the Russian Jewish encounter with the United States. This article looks at their cultural landscapes for what they reveal about how disparate values and ideas were negotiated in the making of place. Alliance and Woodbine were immigrant communities designed in a brief moment rather than evolved over time. They were very much a product of both the funding philanthropists’ and the settlers’ ideas about what communities should look and feel like and how residents should support themselves within them. Both of these groups were responding to intense pressures, and each set of participants had its own way of making sense of them. As the Russian Jewish migration heated up, American settlement patterns were already in the midst of enormous upheaval. Between 1881 and 1920 the nation shifted from predominantly rural to predominantly urban, from predominantly agricultural to majority industrial, from predominantly eastern to much more dispersed across the national territory. In establishing the Jewish agricultural settlements, the founding members weighed individualism versus communitarianism, agriculture versus industrialization, and religion versus secularism. To be successful, the Jewish agricultural settlements had to serve as a meeting ground between the ideology that gave rise to them and the practicality that would allow them to survive and find a niche in a tough market economy. The cultural landscape that arose reflected its builders’ poor road map to the future, but it was their best effort at adaptation to a world in transition.

**The Jews in Russia**

In the 1880s well over 3 million Jews, more than half the world’s Jewish population, lived under severe restrictions in the area of Russia called the “Pale.” They represented 95 percent of Russia’s Jewish population (Lederhendler 1992, 98). A result of joining Russia’s acquisitions from the eighteenth-century Polish partitions to the Ukraine, the Pale could be considered a frontier area. The expansion enlarged the size of the Russian Empire, its ethnic diversity, and its Jewish population because, prior to the partition, Poland had had Europe’s largest Jewish population. Russia’s Jewish population tripled between 1825 and 1880 (Lederhendler 1992, 98), and, although Jews represented only 3.5 percent of Russia’s total population, they constituted 12 percent of the inhabitants of the Pale (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984, 94). For better control of its new area, the Russian government undertook homesteading programs and sent numbers of groups into the region to settle. In 1804 Alexander I expanded those eligible for homesteading to include “colonial Jews” and, starting in 1806, several Jewish agricultural colonies were established (Brutskus 1913; Baron 1964, 92). New cities grew up as well. Within the Pale, clear regional
differences existed among Jews. Eli Lederhendler (1995, 18) suggested that Russian Jews represented less an identity than a mosaic of very different communities. They differed in how they had been affected by or receptive to the forces of modernization, for example. Russian policies eventually enforced some common identity, which developed further in the United States.

Throughout the nineteenth century conditions for Jews varied, changing especially with the ascension of each new czar. The colonization era of the early nineteenth century was followed by a period during which Jews were prohibited from settling in the countryside. During the 1860s and 1870s some Jews were able to enter Russian schools and universities, and a limited number of merchants, skilled artisans and craftsmen, and university graduates were permitted to reside outside the Pale. But beginning in the 1880s with the ascendance of Alexander III (1881–1894) and his counselor, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, whatever loosening had occurred was retracted, and the assimilation managed under more inclusive educational and employment policies halted. The legislation followed a wave of pogroms in more than 100 localities during the spring and summer of 1881 and was ostensibly to reduce violence against Jews. The increased restrictions on them, however, accentuated socioeconomic and cultural differences without stopping the violence. Jews were forbidden to settle in rural districts even within the Pale, and certain cities were ruled off-limits for settlement. Strict quotas were imposed for Jewish students. Jews were prohibited from entering the legal profession or government. Those skilled craftsmen who had been permitted to reside outside the Pale were required to return. It became a criminal offense for a Jew to use a Christian given name. Jews could not move freely, own private land, or enter numerous occupations.3

At the same time, the Jewish population in Russia was growing faster than was that of neighboring groups. According to Solow Baron, between 1820 and 1880 it increased by 150 percent, while the Russian population had an 87 percent increase; in some sections of the Pale, their growth was nearly four times larger than was that of their neighbors (1964, 76). Baron attributed this difference to stronger aid organizations and medical care among the Jews (p. 78).

As the numbers and needs of the Jews rose, their financial position became increasingly fragile. They were harmed by attempts to modernize the Russian economy and to increase and control exports. The small craft workshops of which they had been part as owners and workers lost business to the new industrialized production which, in response to pressures from the guilds, employed ethnic Russians (Baron 1964, 99–100). The Jewish businesses mainly focused on goods for their own local markets; many were bakers, butchers, tailors, shoemakers, glove makers, or carpenters. Forced into fewer and fewer occupations and markets, they ended up competing fiercely with each other for the available business (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984, 95–98). New railroads also changed spatial relationships, and Jews lost their roles in the country towns as innkeepers and intermediaries for landlords (Sorin 1992, 22). Jews were increasingly concentrated into a smaller number of places and fields. This separation did not stop the pogroms—more followed in the 1890s. Be-
between 1881 and 1910, Jewish emigration was high, with each year’s figures rising or falling in direct response to specific pogroms and passage of harsh new restrictions (Joseph [1914] 1969).

**What Is to Be Done?**

Those living within the Pale were part of Europe’s intellectual ferment, grappling with how to organize society and how to live one’s life. Within the Pale one could find major splits between the *maskilim*, the Enlightenment stream of Jews, the Hasidim, the more mystical, and the socialist (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984, 116–125). Odessa was known as an especially vibrant city. In Amos Oz’s memoir of growing up in Israel (2005), Odessans were almost automatically characterized as broad-minded and less tied to tradition. Steven Zipperstein described them as open to and accepting of the new and/or the different, more civic than religious (1983, 35). “If Odessa could be compared at all [to other cities] it was only to the port cities of America, and then only to those on the frontier, like Chicago and San Francisco, where a mixture of enterprise, license, and violence combined to create environments free from the restraints of the past” (1985, 1).

A key movement for the agricultural colonies, the Am Olam (Eternal People), was centered in Odessa. Formed as a discussion group, it was heavily influenced by the Tolstoyan ideas that a productive life required living on and working the land. Yet this was clearly impossible for Jews in Russia. Their ideology, coupled with the pogroms, created a strong push for emigration. The pulls were toward settler societies like the United States, Palestine, and Argentina, places where they could realize their dream to “lead a real healthy and honorable mode of life[,] . . . own a home and land as a means of earning a livelihood, and . . . be true citizens of our adopted country” (Bailey 1932, 12).

The conditions within the Pale provoked a number of responses from Jews outside Russia. How to help and where to help were questions for debate. Could pressure be placed on Russia to improve conditions? Could funds improve education and training within the Pale, and if so, of what kind? The most important of these groups, the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Baron de Hirsch Fund and its arm the Jewish Colonization Association, like the Am Olam, were strongly influenced by physiocratic ideas that set agriculture as the underlying base for economy and society. The Alliance was founded in 1860 in Paris with the mission to protect Jewish citizens and to develop a Jewish community throughout the world that was well educated, especially in matters agricultural and Jewish. The Baron de Hirsch Fund and the Jewish Colonization Association acquired land, established training programs, and sent out settlers to new agricultural colonies in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Palestine, and the United States. Theodore Norman described these efforts as among “the first experiments in planned migration on a large scale” (1985, 2). Their rationale, like the Am Olam’s, was “productivization,” an ugly term dependent on the physiocratic sense that Jewish life must rest on agriculture, both for meaning and for acceptance (p. 119).
The philanthropists’ assumption of the healthful, improving quality of working the land reverberated in different ways with other such widely circulating late-nineteenth-century ideas as social Darwinism, eugenics, and environmental determinism. The philanthropic interests debated the relative weights of nature versus nurture and how these applied to possible beneficiaries. How to help depended on how one parsed the different influences. Moses Klein, administrator of the Baron de Hirsch Fund, for example, argued that for Russia’s Jews to make beneficial use of funds, they must leave the Pale. Implying a sort of scientific surety, he wrote: “The theory established in medical science that remedies applied to cure a certain disease of patients residing in one climate may prove injurious to the same diseases elsewhere when attacking those in other lands, can be well applied to this remedy for the Jews of Galicia and Russia” (Klein 1889, 14–15). Let them go to Palestine, to America, but do not spend money in Russia.

The Alliance Israelite Universelle provided early support for numbers to go to Palestine, buying land for colonies as early as 1878 and again in 1883 as part of a pre-Zionist and then early Zionist movement of return. The Baron de Hirsch Fund added its support in the 1890s (Norman 1985, 54–68). Argentina was another important destination in the 1890s. With support from the Baron de Hirsch Fund, 910 families were resettled in four colonies in 1896. By the height of the resettlement in 1911, nearly a dozen colonies had been founded in five provinces, with 330,000 acres of land and 100,000 settlers in agriculture (pp. 69–89). Other colonies were established in Brazil, Canada, and Turkey.

But the American solution seemed especially promising. In what was thought of as the country of second chances presumably anyone could be remade. This was the homesteading era, and both the U.S. government and the nation’s new railroads encouraged Europeans and Americans to set down new stakes in the West. Yet whether this climate of possibility applied to Jews hung uncomfortably in the air. When the major Eastern European emigration began in 1880 Jews in the United States numbered nearly 230,000. Jews had been part of America since colonial days. A group of 23 Sephardic Jews arrived in New Amsterdam in 1654 from Recife, Brazil. At the time of the first U.S. census of population, 1790, the country was home to 1,200 Jews. By 1848 the Jewish population was 50,000 and rising as German Jews arrived during the mid–nineteenth century. In 1861, Jewish congregations numbered ninety-five, with the largest concentration—twenty—in New York (Marcus 1989, 14). But the Jewish population was much below what it would be by the mid-1920s, when the tally was more than 4 million (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984, 158–159).

American Jews took up the question of what could and should be done with the new immigrants, most of whom went directly to New York. This pattern of concentration made both the large philanthropic groups and earlier Jewish arrivals uneasy. American Jews suffered from negative stereotypes, but much milder in form than European anti-Semitism. Prior to the arrival of the Eastern European Jews they felt less at risk because their numbers were small and had increased gradually (Heinze 2004, 15). With the rapid increase, especially of unassimilated Jews, Ameri-
can-born Jews worried that American anti-Semitism would become more virulent. They worried that they would be lumped together with the rough new immigrants and seen as less American; they wondered whether the new immigrants would remain so foreign and un-American. The philanthropists advocated dispersal to the nation’s many smaller cities, eventually trying the Galveston Plan. In operation between 1907 and 1914, the plan directed new Jewish immigrants to enter the United States through Galveston, Texas in the hopes of diverting them away from the Northeast and into the Southwest.7

The philanthropists directed some to farming as the productive mode of life, and agricultural colonies seemed to offer a promising, if uncertain, solution. At the same time, colonists and their supporters faced the skepticism behind such questions as: “Can a Jew become a successful farmer is a question frequently asked, and almost invariably answered in the negative” (Stainsby 1901, 5). Those who supported the colonies pointed to their beginnings with great optimism, but delivering a positive verdict to the question was essential. In an era of growing academic empiricism, the viability of Jewish agricultural settlement was a proposition to try and to test.

Where Will It Be Done?
The earliest Jewish agricultural experiments were scarcely planned—as agriculture or experiment—and they were truly working against many odds. Failure was not unusual for any of America’s homesteading groups of the time, all of whom were starting anew in unfamiliar areas, absorbing start-up costs, and at risk from too great a time gap between settlement and first profits. Fewer than 50 percent of original homestead claims were actually carried to patent; that is, given title to the land (Gates 1963, 37). Some of the Jewish agricultural colonists’ start-up costs were borne by the philanthropists, but they were a particularly poorly capitalized group. The philanthropists specifically targeted those without sufficient capital to acquire their own farmsteads.8 And although it was desirable that settlers have agricultural experience, it was neither required nor prevalent. Few among the philanthropists themselves came from farming backgrounds that might have informed their decisions on location, equipment, and repayment.

Small efforts to create Jewish agricultural colonies started up around the United States in 1881 and 1882.9 One of the first colonies, Sicily Island, begun in 1881 in the Louisiana bayou country, combined planning by the émigrés in Russia with funding from the Alliance Israelite Universelle and several New York Jews. Its twenty families endured only for a very short time. They planted corn, cotton, and vegetables but more successfully raised mosquitoes and malaria. A spring flood in 1882 washed away houses, cattle, crops, and possessions. No one remained for another season (Davidson 1943, 206; Herscher 1981).

The Hebrew Union Agricultural Society of Cincinnati sent a group west to Cimarron, in southwestern Kansas, later the heart of the Dust Bowl and an agricultural heartbreaker. The 1882 diary of Charles Davis (1965), sent by the society to accompany the group, captured the difficulties of site selection. En route, Davis
heard from a railroad land agent that the land chosen by a previous scout was very poor for agriculture. Alarmed, he determined to learn more. At the Kansas City stop, he sent one man off to the state agricultural agent in Topeka while he waited in Kansas City with the rest of the group, most of whom spoke no English. He spoke to cowboys at the stockyards who said the area was good stock country but poor for farming. He spoke to a railroad agent who recommended the wetter eastern part of the state. The state agent, however, subscribed to the then-prevalent notion that rain follows the plow, so drylands around Cimarron would become suitable for agriculture once they began. Davis trusted him rather than the stockmen and railroad agent, who, he feared, were trying to divert his group from a prime opportunity. What remains of Davis’s diary ends with the group happily arrived in Cimarron ready to purchase farm implements. But, like the Louisiana effort, the colony lasted only very briefly.

One of the more initially successful efforts was New Odessa, 250 miles south of Portland, Oregon. It drew on members of Am Olam, and its members were both more radical ideologically and more prepared. Before heading to Oregon some worked on farms in Connecticut, New York, and Indiana in order to acquire relevant experience. Upon arrival in Portland, some were designated to remain in Portland to earn money and learn English. The group’s 750 acres were well wooded, and tree clearance brought income. But the colony foundered, either because of disagreements over leadership and ideology (Herscher 1981, 37–48) or, according to the Jewish Agricultural Society, because of the lack of women (JAS 1954, 156).

A few groups of families tried homesteading in North Dakota. One colony increased in size at first, from twenty to seventy-one families, but drought and prairie fires in 1884 and 1885 and crop failures in 1886 uprooted the community. A few of the settlers moved to Iola, near Devils Lake (Robinson 1912). Painted Woods colony, in Ramsey County, met the same fate. By 1890 the county tax collector wrote to the Baron de Hirsch Fund requesting aid for the remaining few whose poor wheat crop left them lacking sufficient food and clothing to survive the winter (Hale 1890). The philanthropic interests had no desire to see such failures: “The moral effect of the dissolution of the ‘Painted Woods Colony’ upon colonization interests in general could certainly be most disastrous, and the hope which we have cherished that in time we may be able to build up agricultural pursuits among our co-religionists, thus opening a large field for the disposition of the surplus immigration, would receive a set-back from which it could not recover for a long time to come,” wrote Jacob Schiff (1886).

**Opportunities for the Many of Small Means**

South Jersey’s Alliance, opened in 1882, and Woodbine, begun in 1892, have been considered the most successful Jewish agricultural colonies in the nation (Figure 1), for they grew the largest, lasted the longest, and received the most funding and widespread attention. Their agriculture survived for at least thirty years, and the towns developed distinct and ongoing identities rather than being absorbed into
neighboring, non-Jewish communities. The New Jersey location had several advantages over Louisiana, Kansas, or North Dakota. New Jersey was comparatively close to the philanthropic organizations, large urban markets, and kinsmen, and South Jersey especially was still lightly populated and its land inexpensive.

During the late nineteenth century New Jersey was concerned that it was losing farmers to the nation’s new agricultural lands in the West and so tried to attract and retain farmers. In an 1884 speech to the state Board of Agriculture, New Jersey Congressman William Walter Phelps pitched New Jersey’s and especially South Jersey’s agricultural land, claiming that income and profits were highest there (1884). The Bridgeton Commercial League of South Jersey’s Cumberland County developed a promotional brochure detailing information on soils, crops, yields, and lands available. It stated: “The lure of free western land has carried the immigrant away from New Jersey and left thousands of acres of excellent land undeveloped. This land affords great opportunities for the many of small means” (Bridgeton Commercial League 1913, 13). The brochure promised that strawberries planted one spring would
yield $300 an acre the next. If further testimonial was needed, it noted, New Jersey’s Prison Labor Commission had selected Cumberland County as best for growing farm produce, and it had already purchased 1,000 acres for that purpose.

Alliance, named in honor of its founding philanthropic organization, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, was established in Pitts Grove, Salem County, only 40 miles from Philadelphia and about 100 miles from New York City on the Central Jersey railroad line. The purchase of more than 1,000 wooded acres involved multiple parties—a local realtor who also served as New Jersey’s commissioner of immigration; the Leach Brothers, sellers from nearby Vineland; and the buyers, the Hebrew Emigrant Society and the Alliance Israelite Universelle, who then turned the purchase over to the Alliance Land Company (Brandes and Douglas 1971, 53). The first group of forty-three families arrived in the spring of 1882. When they detrained, they found only three buildings to shelter them, all recently erected by the Leach Brothers. The largest housed twenty-six families in small rooms opening on both sides of

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**FIG. 2—Schematic map of Alliance, New Jersey in the late nineteenth century. Sources: Committee on Arrangements 1932; Klein 1935 (Cartography by Rutgers Cartography Lab)**
an unfloored passageway. The rooms were just large enough for a bed, small table, and chairs. Each room contained high storage shelves on which to put the few articles owned by residents. The settlers cooked communally in one building but ate separately in their own rooms. Stoves, bedding, farm equipment, and furniture that the Hebrew Emigrant Aid Society was to provide had been delayed in transit.

The plan was to allot each household a 14-acre farm while leaving several acres in common, to be distributed as more people arrived. Settlers began to clear the trees, put up houses, and plant crops; then they waited to see whether the seeds would bear fruit. Initial conditions were hard, and most colonists spent the first few years working as hired laborers on the nearby farms of their non-Jewish neighbors. Whole families would walk in search of farms in need of help. They picked by the season, first berries, then grapes, then corn, then cranberries. The first years were especially difficult for the group. They suffered from mosquitoes, flies, and poison ivy. The children would become hungry picking, eat the unripe fruit, and come home with stomachaches. But returning from hours of picking, they still had their own lands to tend (Bailey 1932). According to Ellen Eisenberg, the first arrivals, especially those from Odessa, were ideologically more committed to communitarian practice, clearing the land together and planning on farming jointly as well (1995, 27). The commitment waned as new arrivals with more individualistic views arrived and with clear direction from the philanthropists.

The homesteads and farmsteads were not outright gifts but required repayment, so the colonists needed income. Many settlers failed and left, but renewed colonizing efforts brought others. A cigar factory was introduced to provide work during the winter when farming would leave them free. The factory lasted only two years, and then needlework served the same purpose. At first the residents worked from home under contract from Jewish manufacturers in Philadelphia and New York City. Later several clothing factories were established locally. Newspaper reports published in 1885 described the struggles in the colonies, but in 1887 they saw improvement—good crops, new houses and stables, happy people (Geffen 1971, 372) (Figure 2). By 1889 Klein optimistically cited the average annual profits for Alliance’s farmers as $280, excluding produce for their own use (p. 49). Less than half the average wage for a factory worker, at a time when eggs were 10 cents a dozen and a loaf of bread sold for 5 cents, the profits of Alliance farmers indicate the degree to which a agricultural labor life was hardly an Edenic choice.

Though struggling, Alliance was the small center of a colonization movement, with nearby Norma, Rosenhayn, Brotmanville, and Carmel, all founded in the 1880s. Each of these had its own mix of agriculture and industry, its own ideological bent, depending on auspices and settlers. Norma, site of the railroad station used by Alliance’s farmers, became more of an industrial town. Its benefactor, the Philadelphian Maurice Fels, established a model farm there and a cannery so that the farmers need not pay to transport their produce. Rosenhayn, also started in 1882, had a more uneven history. Started with less secure sponsorship, it nearly collapsed entirely after an epidemic but revived in 1887, inspired by Alliance’s success. In 1889
the population reached 300, and by 1901 it stood at 800, its workers evenly divided between agriculture and industry (Stainsby 1901). Its crops were valued at $10,000–
12,000. Of its nine manufacturing establishments, the clothing industry employed the largest number of workers: 160. Carmel, 3 miles southwest of Alliance, also began in 1882, with the help mainly of an individual philanthropist, Michael Heilprin, who acquired land from W. H. Miller of Philadelphia and brought seventeen Russian Jews to begin its cultivation. On 123 of its 848 acres they grew corn, rye, buck-
wheat, vegetables, and berries. They put up houses, schools, and outbuildings. They added stores, a library, school, and synagogue (Klein 1889, 57).

The colonies attracted visitors who wanted to assess Jewish agriculture, and some wrote of what they saw to justify support for more immigration. In his 1887 address to the Young Men’s Hebrew Association in New York, Benjamin Peixotto, former ambassador to Romania and head of B’nai B’rith, the Jewish service organization founded in New York City in 1843, forcefully argued that American Jews should help Eastern European Jews by bringing them to America. He reassured his listeners about the immigrants’ dependability: Of the 50,000 new Russian immigrants in the two preceding years, only 27 were returned as paupers. His reports on the progress of recent agricultural experiments like Alliance added persuasion; American Jews could “feel encouraged to receive those who do come here and to assist them; assist them in a way that they shall be a blessing to themselves and an honor to Israel” (Peixotto 1887, 3). Agriculture, he said, both ennobles and allows for an unbiased assessment of Jews’ capability, for rainfall is insensitive to religion. In arguing for intervention, Peixotto explicitly Americanized Eastern European Jews by likening them to earlier, worthy religious groups, the Pilgrims and the Huguenots. Like them, this new group would rise rapidly to become fully self-supporting and fully assimilated.10

Charles Bernheimer, settlement house leader and superintendent of the Hebrew Educational Society (1910–1918), captured the American Jews’ ambivalence toward the immigrants. Reflecting a Darwinian view, he wrote that the experience of Russian Jews made for a race of physically unattractive but good survivors, prone to nervous but not debilitating diseases: “The final result is that the Jews at present are a picked race which can resist pain, misfortune, grief, worry, starvation, disease, and even death better than other civilized races. Those who were shiftless, immoral, lazy, incorrigible drunkards could not remain Jews under the medieval persecutions. Only those who were strong, healthy, and energetic could venture to remain Jews—hence their longevity” (Bernheimer 1905, 294). But after visiting the colonies, he found the population much improved, not just productive but also healthier and more attractive—clearly a salubrious effect.

Woodbine was the largest of the South Jersey colonies, set on 5,300 sandy acres in Cape May County and with two railroads. Established by the Baron de Hirsch Fund, its planning was somewhat more elaborate than that of the previous decade’s colonies, and throughout the 1880s some of the philanthropists became more astute about what the colonies needed in order to succeed. Peixotto, for example, in
his promotion of agricultural colonies as a solution for the new immigrants, laid out the types of things to consider: soil quality and distance from markets were high on his list, and he thought that lessons might be learned from the Quakers, the Mennonites, and other religious groups (Peixotto 1887). The first fifty families arrived in the spring of 1892. Each family unit received 15 acres as their original grant, to which they might later add an additional 15. Some of the men had already spent time at Woodbine the previous year earning salaries from the Baron de Hirsch Fund by building the homes. These structures were a decided improvement on those in Alliance—the smallest had five rooms. The town grew more rapidly than did the other agricultural experiments (Figures 3 and 4). Like Alliance, it added industry to its mix after a trying first two years. A town site was laid out in 1897 with factories. It had larger, more ambitious public buildings than did the other colonies. It created its own water system, a power plant to generate electricity for factories and homes, an agricultural school, and an industrial training school, and it was incorporated as an independent borough in 1903, to become what was “known as the first self-governing Jewish community since the fall of Jerusalem” (Sam Azeez Museum 2003).

The Cultural Landscape of the Colonies

The colonies were raw places, their newness fully apparent in the roughness of the first buildings and the look of the partially cleared land (Figure 5). The philanthropists had a decisive influence on the layout and building styles, but long-standing
Fig. 4—Along the railroad track in Woodbine, New Jersey in about 1910. © Copyright American Jewish Historical Society, all rights reserved. Reproduced courtesy of the American Jewish Historical Society, Newton Centre, Massachusetts and New York, New York.

Fig. 5—Working in the fields in Woodbine, New Jersey in about 1910. © Copyright American Jewish Historical Society, all rights reserved. Reproduced courtesy of the American Jewish Historical Society, Newton Centre, Massachusetts and New York, New York.
institutions of Russian Jewish life were necessary as well. The colonies would not have existed without the philanthropists’ support, because start-up costs were too high for the colonists. The funders, largely New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore German Jews, shared many of the aims of American Progressives in that their impulse was reformist. Michael McGerr describes Progressives as wishing to instill values of mutualism and independence as well as personal restraint in their target population, a set of objectives very much in keeping with the colonies’ funders (2003). They were also associated with the settlement-house movement, which combined missionary activity with social mission, emphasizing healthful housing, education, job training, and better working conditions. The philanthropists set up schools, launched training programs, and provided civics classes to ensure that immigrants acquired an education that would fit them into American society and allow them to pay their way. They regularly established credit unions to help the settlers manage their money, to prosper, and to repay their benefactors (Joseph [1914] 1969, ix; Norman 1985). Samuel Joseph’s official history of the Baron de Hirsch Fund begins by celebrating its accomplishments. Its work “anticipate[d] many of the social techniques which have become commonplace in social engineering,” inspiring its beneficiaries, as well as others, in “American sentiment and practice” (p. ix). From the Baron de Hirsch Fund and Jewish Colonization Association correspondence one can see that the highest compliment for any effort, whether a factory, road, or appliance, was to deem it “modern.”

The philanthropists enlisted the built environment in their cause. Alliance and Woodbine were laid out on a grid, each block platted into easily transferable lots. Street naming was part of the Americanization process. Woodbine’s were for American presidents, patriots, poets, and philanthropists. Washington was the main street, but one could live on the corner of Jackson and Clay or on Longfellow. The Baron de Hirsch Fund envisioned and commissioned single-family houses, each neatly set back on its lot. Large farm acreage was at the edge of town. In Woodbine, one of the blocks was designated for a community park, in keeping with the rising assumption of the benefits conferred by improving quality of parks for the poorer classes. Playing fields also helped in Americanization; the towns rapidly developed local baseball teams and leagues—and even a grandstand (H. Eisenberg 1932, 22). Joseph linked the colonies to earlier Anglo and American ones: Woodbine had “a lay-out similar to the medieval English village, later copied in New England. . . . The project[,] so reminiscent of pioneer days, struck the imagination of the public press” (1935, 50). Notice Joseph’s choice of comparison, rather than to the equally plausible—or implausible—Russian mir as agricultural village or shtetl as market town. His image breezed over questions of ownership and distribution of profits from crops that distinguished these forms. However, the link works better with New England than medieval England, with its implications of religious persecution and, equally important, the colonies’ emphasis on freeholding.

“The enthusiasm of the German Jews for social engineering was not generally shared by their potential beneficiaries,” noted Gerald Sorin (1992, 64). The corre-
spondence between the land companies and the settlers indicates that they believed their repayment schedule made them the victims of economic shock therapy. If Americanization meant accepting merciless market forces, they wanted slow entry (Klein 1889; Bailey 1932; Brandes and Douglas 1971; Herscher 1981). Moreover, individuals varied in their commitment to the colonies. Some settlers clearly chose the colonies because they wanted to farm and hoped to stay on. Others saw them as a way station on their road elsewhere, and yet others were unsure, recruited straight off the boat by the Baron de Hirsch Fund agents stationed at immigration centers in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to help new arrivals.

The settlers, mainly new or nearly new to America, brought their own expectations of community from Russia, but their experiences and outlooks varied depending on where in the Pale they had lived and on their financial position, education, and religious observance. Alliance’s first group was soon followed by a small, second wave. Samuel Bailey (1932), a member of the second group, emphasized their role; they were the forward-looking, Odessan intelligentsia, with a clearer sense of what should be done than that of the first poor, befuddled newcomers. Ellen Eisenberg’s study of Alliance emphasized the foundational impact of the Am Olam and the Pale’s southeastern immigrants, those from cities such as Odessa, Kiev, and Elizabethgrad more generally (1995, 91–118). She describes the earliest period as Alliance’s most communitarian, not just of necessity before individual lots were established but also by intent. Farms, for example, clustered in groups of four to facilitate the sharing of implements. Over time, however, the number of less ideological Jews from the northwestern Pale rose, reflecting their increasing dominance in the overall migration stream. But most important, “the sponsors’ belief in the benefits of private ownership and reverence for the yeoman farmer as the model citizen” meant that the community developed as a place of individualistic practices (p. 113).

Members of the Am Olam were also prominent in the founding of Woodbine. One of the most important was H. L. Sabsovich, hired by the Baron de Hirsch Fund as the community’s first superintendent or overseer. He grew up in Odessa, trained in agronomy in Switzerland, and in Russia advocated the application of science to agriculture. After arriving in the United States in 1887, he worked for a time as a peddler until he was appointed assistant director of the agricultural experiment station in Fort Collins, Colorado. The Baron de Hirsch Fund’s offer gave him an important role in his long-cherished dream of Jewish agriculture. His wife’s memoir describes a man of enormous energy and total devotion to bettering conditions for his compatriots. In Woodbine he served as overseer, mayor, school administrator, teacher, and farmer (K. Sabsovich 1922, 36). As local administrator he negotiated with the state and counties on road building, with contractors on new buildings, and with the Baron de Hirsch Fund on which blocks should be opened first to settlement (see for example, H. L. Sabsovich 1899, 1900, 1901, various dates). He epitomized the modern, civic-minded, yet physiocratic Odessan Jew.

Other colonists were more traditional. The shtetls of the Pale, from which many of the settlers came, resembled medieval villages, accretions of buildings and wind-
ing streets. The market was the center of the town, and it served both Jewish and non-Jewish populations whose quarters, as part of the towns, were within sight of each other—closer than in the new colonies (Dobroszycki and Kirschenblatt-Gimblett 1977). As Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog described them, buildings throughout the town were typically shabby wooden structures, even the synagogues. Houses around the market, which belonged to the better-off residents, tended to be larger, perhaps two storied, with the lower level serving as a store. Most of the houses, though, were one-story affairs, surrounded by a small yard, perhaps containing a vegetable garden. Zborowski and Herzog argued that the shabbiness reflected a distinct worldview. “There is no ‘Jewish’ architecture. The characteristic features of the buildings are their age and shabbiness. . . . The general appearance of neglect declares . . . the fact that the house is viewed as a temporary shell. My ‘shtetl’ is the people who live in it, not the place or the buildings or the street” (1952, 61–62), whether residents had lived in them briefly or for a century; then again, pogroms might make one loathe to invest in buildings that might be destroyed or call attention to one’s wealth. John Klier describes the large public buildings as unpainted on the outside but colorful within (2000, 29–30). David Roskies further disembodies the shtetl: “when the shtetl was still home to millions of Jews, it was described, if at all, as a state of mind. . . . The very concept of a map was foreign to the conceptual framework of the shtetl inhabitants, whether real or imaginary” (2000, 4). Yoram Bar-Gal divided the shtetl into two distinct realms, each with its own core and periphery (1985). The functional core had the market at its center; the cultural core was the synagogue. It was the cultural layout the migrants had brought with them.

Alliance’s original buildings conveyed this same provisional sense. Bailey’s memoir of the colony’s early days described the houses as “shanties” (1932). They were 14-foot cubes, with one room and a garret for sleeping. Made of pine and plastered on the inside, they provided little insulation, and Bailey remembers the severe cold. But the buildings were laid out on the more orderly, American-influenced grid, with more land between houses, and photographs of Woodbine’s early days show houses like those that line the streets of many New Jersey towns—simple white frame homes, one- or two-story clapboard buildings with steeply pitched roofs and center chimneys, each set on its own lot, some with porches. One or two even have low, white picket fences. Sabsovich—reflecting the American adoption of ornamental lawns—initiated and received support for a program to reward homeowners for beautifying their yards, adding plantings of ornamental shrubs, flowers, and lawns. He thought that this would encourage neater habits on the part of the settlers. It would also add a note of permanence to the landscape. He had streets resurveyed to make sure that roads were properly straight, and he added shade trees for beautification (H. L. Sabsovich 1900).

The placement of synagogues reflected two traditions. The model was not the Puritan village the philanthropists liked to invoke, in which the church was central and fronted on the village green. In the shtetl, the market—not the synagogue—stood
at the center, and the houses radiated out from it. The shtetl was likely to have several synagogues, possibly representing different practices or trades, dispersed throughout the community rather than commanding a strategic location (Zborowski and Herzog 1952). Synagogues were religious, social, cultural, and educational centers that were always close at hand. On the other hand, a new synagogue in Odessa was designed to be elegant, with space for a choir, more like a church (Zipperstein 1985, 60).

Alliance’s first synagogue was erected in 1888, another in 1889, and two more in later years. Woodbine built its synagogue immediately. The numbers (several) and locations (dispersed) were more like the pattern of the shtetl, and American Jews bemusedly wondered whether they reflected religious divisions or convenience for attendance (Klein 1889). Ellen Eisenberg described the religious rifts within the community as being evident in the places of worship (1995, 91). These synagogues assumed a role in the life of the community comparable to that of their Pale counterparts. Religion and education were liberally mixed with discussion groups, meetings, and English-language classes, all held in houses of worship. The first synagogues were built of wood, but over time the more solid and substantial brick became the building material of choice. The buildings were airy and light with many windows, reflecting, perhaps, the congregations’ sense of security at the same time that they accorded more with those synagogues built by American-born Jews (Figure 6).

The shtetl and the colonies contained a cemetery, bathhouse, and several centers of learning. Both in the Pale and New Jersey, towns tended to locate along a stream. In the Pale, it was understood that men and women had separate bathing sections. Alliance had its designated men’s and women’s bathing sections in the river (Figure 2), but the colonies added indoor plumbing as rapidly as they could. Both colonies had a building for ritual bathing. The cemetery traditionally was at the outer edge of the community and, though important, was normally avoided (Zborowski and Herzog, 376–377). Alliance’s cemetery was at the edge of town—but next to houses (Purmell 1981). Woodbine’s was, and still is, set apart from the town, with no houses adjoining it.

Learning was valued highly in the colonies, and education took place in a variety of places throughout the community—in synagogues, auditoriums, or the study of a rabbi or learned man. But formal education was in public, not religious schools, and in English. Alliance’s students went to Vineland for high school. Woodbine began both an industrial training school and an agricultural school with substantial investment from the philanthropic organizations. These were ambitious endeavors, requiring purpose-built facilities. The Agricultural School, described as the first agricultural high school in the United States, was a prominent feature of the town’s landscape, taking up a number of acres for buildings and fields at the edge of the town. It looked solid, with its brick structures, and the classroom building was topped by a steeple with a bell to call students to classes. The school had dormitories and outbuildings for animals. It was clearly to serve as an educational beacon (K. Sabsovich 1922; Bailey 1932; Eisenberg 1995).
Both towns included some commerce, but neither took on as central a market role as the shtetl once did. The shtetl's prominence as a market center was itself declining and altering in the late nineteenth century in response to economic changes. Alla Sokolova's study of Podolia, a region in present-day Ukraine, describes the way the center began to serve the poorest Jews, as the wealthier ones put some distance

![Image: The Woodbine Brotherhood Synagogue, now the Sam Azeez Museum of Woodbine Heritage. (Photograph by the author, March 2005)]

between themselves and the older sections of town, especially as the old market businesses became less financially lucrative (2000, 37–40). Thus the old landscape would have been an uncertain blueprint.

Alliance lacked a clear center. If there was a gathering point, it was the post office and general store; memoirs of the early days mention walks with friends to the post office to check for mail but really to pass the time, to see and be seen (Bailey 1932;
H. Eisenberg 1932; Purvell 1981). The general store and the other stores that were started later had a small trade and were interspersed along the residential streets. Alliance farmers took their produce to nearby Vineland to sell, and everyone went there regularly to buy supplies (H. Eisenberg 1932). Woodbine, by design, had more of a center on Washington Street, which was lined with shops and did a lively business, especially on Sundays. But many small businesses were located along the other streets, where home and business combined easily.

Though not in the original plans, industrial buildings rapidly became part of the landscape, especially in Woodbine. The farmers lacked sufficient income, and so the agricultural experiment had to change. Alliance’s Baron de Hirsch Fund agent first renegotiated the repayment schedule and then reframed the terms of the experiment. Agriculture in Alliance was not subsistence. The farmers needed a market to keep them afloat. A cannery would help as well, providing an even larger buyer. The Norma cannery was situated near the railroad station for ease of transporting canned goods to the urban markets. Factories with workers would buy the farmers’ produce. Rather than destroying Jewish agriculture, factories would save it. The community would still rest on Jewish agriculture, but now it would support a larger and healthier community that might otherwise have to live in the dreary, difficult cities.\(^\text{12}\) By 1901 a state survey of Alliance found its population equally divided between agriculture and industry. In Alliance one factory started up closer to the Maurice River. Small ones might adjoin houses, but in Woodbine several large ones located along the railroad tracks (Klein 1889; Stainsby 1901; Goldstein 1921, 13–22; Baron de Hirsch Fund Archives various dates).

Of Alliance’s nine manufacturing establishments, the clothing industry—familiar to, but less desirable than, other industries—employed the largest number of workers. “It was hoped that industries would be established that are more manly and promising for the future than that of needlework, to which, unfortunately, too many of the Russian refugees have been forced to devote themselves” (Klein 1889, 51). Woodbine’s factory buildings were subject to Baron de Hirsch Fund approval, and they went up as the familiar red-brick structures of the day, long and low with large windows allowing natural light to complement the hanging bulbs inside. Woodbine’s power plant made available a reliable source of electricity. Industry was part of the town, but not the physically dominant part, especially when viewing its landscape. Even as the towns’ economic fortunes vacillated, there was a will to keep them small rather than to become truly urban.

\textbf{And in the End}

After 1892 the Jewish aid societies gave up establishing agricultural colonies, although they still supported the existing colonies until after World War I. It took until 1913 for them to acknowledge that retreat (Maze 1952). They maintained their promotion of agriculture by supporting the Jewish Agricultural Society—later Jewish Agricultural and Industrial Society—and publications like the periodical \textit{Jewish Farmer} (Brandes and Douglas 1971, 93). After World War I, Russian Jewish immigration
was no longer high, and so the experiment faded. The philanthropists always intended their funding of the colonies to be temporary. Woodbine’s Agricultural School provides a useful prism to view their gradual philanthropic retreat.

The school started auspiciously in 1894 and grew rapidly, adding more young men and later young women and increasing the size of the staff. Growth in enrollment drove requests for more funds for expansion; more dormitories were needed, as were bigger facilities for dining and new outbuildings for animals and for plants. After a decade-long effort, the philanthropic organizations resisted the requests. Correspondence back and forth from 1901 to 1915 reveals an increasingly unwilling funder (Hale 1890; Baron de Hirsch Fund Records various dates). The Jewish Colonization Society suggested higher standards for the school: more selectivity in admissions; better training of teachers; smaller would be better. Those who came out of the school would serve as inspiring examples. But more to the point, the funders’ own resources decreased, and they no longer felt they should pour as much money into this one endeavor (Leven 1915; Meyerson 1915). In 1917 the school was closed and turned over to the state. It reopened in 1921 as the Woodbine School for the Feeble-Minded, no longer Jewish and no longer agricultural.

The colonies peaked in 1901 (Shapiro 1977, 301). Jewish farming, ultimately, was not done in colonies (Shpall 1950, 146). Instead, individual or small groups of farmers set themselves up on land outside the city in which they had settled, sometimes with the aid of the Jewish Agricultural Society (Maze 1952). Many of these farmers were taking their second step in the United States, leaving the confines of the city they already knew but maintaining their ties to it. They had a ready-made market for their goods, and many supplemented their income by welcoming city dwellers to profit from the fresh air of their farms. Leonard Robinson’s 1910 census of Jewish agriculture counted 3,438 farms across the country, with nearly two-thirds in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. States where colonies had existed at one time tended to have larger numbers, but the only states with none at all were Nevada and New Mexico (1912, 59). Jewish agriculture was distinctive, if not unique. Although Jewish farmers lived in every state, they concentrated in the Northeast, the one American region then losing farms and farm acreage (Davidson 1943, 23). The farms left behind as insufficiently productive provided an opportunity for those of small means.

The question still lingered, Could a Jew become a farmer? Studies showed they could. In his 1921 dissertation Philip Goldstein stated: “This history will, I hope, establish that, given a favorable location and the satisfactory educational and social opportunities without which he can nowhere be happy, the Jewish farmer will produce as good a crop per acre as his Scotch or Scandinavian neighbor; that, therefore, the opinion that the Jew is unsuited to farming is entirely contrary to the actual fact” (1921, 13). That is, given the right conditions, Jews were as agrarian as any other group. Responses to the sociologist Gabriel Davidson’s 1940s questionnaire, sent to Jewish farmers around the country, revealed that 90 percent of them had come from nonagricultural backgrounds but that they had adapted well. Eighty percent
responded that they were satisfied with farming and thought it a good life choice. Ninety-two percent thought that Jews could be good farmers. Ninety-five percent had good relations with their neighbors, who often were not Jewish. They had become an indistinguishable part of rural America.

The urgent need to demonstrate that Jews could farm had dissipated as the number of farmers across the country dropped and as their communities increasingly felt marginalized. The country was no longer the same agricultural experiment it had been twenty years earlier. The children of the agricultural colonies had become so Americanized that they engaged in that most American of American practices, moving on and moving up.14

More than one hundred years after their founding, Alliance and Woodbine betray their origins in small ways rather than large (Figure 7). An occasional Jewish star on a building is probably the most overt sign, and the cemeteries remain. Alliance, the first among its neighbors, has actually dropped off the map, while once-nearby Norma and Brotmanville persist, but more as crossroads. Street names—Schiff, Eisenberg, Gershel—still recollect the funders. Each road has an unpredictable pattern of small farms with orchards and chicken houses interspersed with the old frame houses or newer suburban ranches (Figure 8). But the towns were long ago absorbed into surrounding communities.
Woodbine is more of a place. On its southern end are horse farms, and to the north new developments are under construction. What was once a large synagogue on Washington Street opened as the Sam Azeez Museum of Woodbine Heritage in 2003. The population of both communities is more likely to be African American (Woodbine’s is more than 30 percent) and Hispanic (Vineland, which has subsumed Alliance, is more than 30 percent Hispanic). Pentecostal churches have replaced the synagogues. The old agricultural school, turned over to the state in 1917, still occupies the most acreage. Since 1921 it has been a residential facility for those with developmental disabilities, as well as a unit of the Department of Human Services. Neither Alliance nor Woodbine was gifted with good soils. They were part of a pineland and a wetland, with sandy or tannic soils. Instead of becoming centers of expanding agriculture, Jewish or otherwise, today both adjoin conservation lands—the Nature Conservancy’s in the case of Alliance and a state park for Woodbine. That, too, is a typical American story—of worthy, but misplaced, ambition.

NOTES
2. In his much-reported 2005 speech, Harvard President Lawrence Summers, in introducing the subject of the underrepresentation of women in the sciences, alluded to other understudied and poorly understood cases, one of which was Jews in farming and agriculture. According to Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984, 166), less than 25 percent of Jewish immigrants between 1900 and 1902 identified
themselves as laborers, servants, or farmers, compared with 80 percent for other immigrant groups. Some clearly did farm, however, and many had their own kitchen gardens and chickens.

3. Goldscheider and Zuckerman reported that 3 percent of Jews in the Pale earned their living from agriculture and that 40 percent were artisans and laborers, with the largest number in the clothing trades (1984, 95). Solow Baron gave the figure as 2.33 percent of Russian Jews in agriculture, compared with 90 percent of Russians (1964, 233).

4. The philanthropic and colonization movements formed a complex web, with funds from those such as Baron de Hirsch and the Rothschilds sparking a variety of organizations, whose missions could include land acquisition, resettlement, or training and could reinforce each others’ work. The Hebrew Emigrant Aid Society, an American philanthropy, was another key organization within the United States, but it was less overtly physiocratic.

5. The Argentine colonies declined, because of conflicts between the funders and the settlers and, especially, because of labor unrest in Argentina that some of the colonists supported (Norman 1985, 129). In response, the Argentine government clamped down on immigration.

6. For a table of population and source region throughout U.S. history, see Elazar 1995, 53.

7. The Galveston Plan, developed by the German American Jewish financier Jacob Schiff, in alliance with the Industrial Relocation Agency, was responsible for bringing approximately 10,000 Jews through that port (Marinbach 1983).

8. Klein (1935, 33–34) discussed how individual farmers with capital were buying abandoned farms in New England.

9. The very first talk of a Jewish agricultural colony was for an 1825 project—Ararat, in upstate New York—but the project never moved from announcement to settlement (Herscher 1981, 29). Jews in American Agriculture mentions an 1820–1823 colonization plan, omitted by other writers, for 36,000 acres in Florida’s Alachua County, which included seventy families from New York and New Jersey (IAS 1954, 16). Information on the number of such small colonies seems to be increasing rapidly as offshoots of genealogical research are shared on the Internet. For many years Uri Herscher’s volume was the standard work on the subject (1981). He enumerated about twenty colonies in addition to those in South Jersey: Bethlehem-Jehudah and Cremieux, in South Dakota; an unnamed settlement in Arkansas; Cotopaxi, Colorado; an additional colony in North Dakota; Palestine (later Bad Axe), Michigan; and, without detail, efforts in Utah, California, New Waterview, Virginia, and Aiken County, South Carolina. But he omits a few I found in recent searches, particularly very small groups that started up after the first had collapsed.

10. This tactic was employed by many advocates for the immigrants. For another example, see Klein 1935, 10. From a different angle, Andrew Heinz, in his recent book on American and American-Jewish identities and psychologies, notes that Jews have often been depicted as having the qualities associated with American businessmen, but taken to extremes that make them psychologically vulnerable (2004, 23).

11. Although the settlement-house movement is more often associated with gritty cities, it also worked in rural areas. America’s rural population of most interest to the settlement movement was in Appalachia. Unlike the Jewish agricultural colonies, however, the Appalachian settlement movement did not remake the places; instead, they focused on the region’s people. They established educational programs intended to draw people from their homes in the hollows and to take up crafts thought to be part of their heritage (Whisnant 1983). Place eventually was remade, however, if one considers the major reworkings of place and people in the ambitions of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Boyce 2004).

12. Although the factories helped the communities survive, they caused concern among some in the labor movement. An article in the Weekly Bulletin of the Clothing Trades described Woodbine thus: “It is a charity bred town, a charity fed town, and dependent on extrinsic aid for its breath of life. It has no soul of its own.” Its factories only worked if they underbid union scale. It was “irredeemably scab” (Sullivan 1905, 5).


14. Goldscheider and Zuckerman wrote: “Jews responded in diverse ways to the process of becoming Americans. They were socially and geographically mobile, became educated, entered the middle
classes, and reformed their religion" (1984, 157). Each one of these directions one can view as a move away from the colonies. For a thorough exploration of the success of the Russian Jewish immigrant group, see Birmingham 1984; for changes in perception of their identity, see Brodkin 1998.

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